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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The violent events of June 2007 in Gaza resulted in an internal divide of the Palestinian 
Authority into two separate governments – a Fatah-controlled West Bank and Hamas-led 
Gaza – and catalyzed the revival of the peace process. Concerned on the one hand with 
the deterioration of the situation in the Palestinian Territory and pleased with the 
emergence of a government in Ramallah free of problematic Islamist elements, the 
Quartet lifted the political and economic embargo on the Palestinian Authority in the 
West Bank. Immediately, there was a rush to create an opportunity for the start of peace 
negotiations. Gaza was left on its own to suffer crippling sanctions imposed by the Israeli 
government, hoping that the continuous worsening of the humanitarian situation – as 
opposed to renewed development in the West Bank – would pressure Hamas into handing 
over the power to Fatah. Against such a background, President Mahmoud Abbas and 
Prime Minsiter Ehud Olmert made a commitment, at a US-brokered peace conference in 
Annapolis to launch negotiations on permanent status issues and reach to an agreement 
before the end of 2008. Despite criticism of the initiative, which was launched before 
national reconciliation could be achieved among Palestinian parties, members of the Arab 
League attended the meeting. Among the participants, were members of the European 
Union, including 2 new member states – Slovenia, as the country holding the EU 
presidency at the time, and Poland.     
Based on more than 30 interviews with government officials, experts, journalists and 
development workers in Poland, Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) and 
Jordan, this report is a study of Poland’s policy, as a new EU member state (2004-2008), 
towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It looks at the role Poland plays or could 
potentially play in the Middle East Peace Process, while investigating whether a need 
exists for a greater involvement of new EU member states in the context of the re-launch 
of negotiations with the Annapolis conference. Additionally, it examines Palestinian and 
Israeli perceptions of Poland in respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
 Key findings of the study can be summarized in the following points.     
 
Key Findings:   
 Poland’s policy towards the Middle East is comprised of two instruments: its military 
presence (Iraq, Afghanistan) and peacekeeping missions (South Lebanon and the 
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Golan Heights), as well as development aid, which it has been deploying since its 
integration into the European Union. The Polish government identified the Palestinian 
Authority as one of its nine priority countries in terms of assistance and thus its policy 
responds to EU Council resolutions. However, its development assistance 
programme, remains a relatively small portion of the total EU contributions to the 
Palestinians.  
 Poland maintains a policy of “equal distance” aspiring to keep good relations with 
both parties and appear as a neutral player. There is a belief among certain Polish 
policy-making circles that Poland can mediate between Israel and the Palestinians 
given its good relations with both parties, a lack of colonial past and the recent 
experience of structural transformation.  
  Due to a common history with the Jewish people and a very complex and emotional 
relationship, Israel expects more of Poland than and any other EU members in terms 
of political support. Despite Poland’s desire to be ‘neutral’ towards the conflict, the 
most common perception among Israeli officials is that Poland is “Israel’s 
ambassador in the European Union”.  
 For a very long time, new EU member states were ignored by the Palestinians, 
because of the Soviet bloc’s legacy of traditionally good relations, extensive 
commercial ties and political alliances with Arab states. Poland, along with other new 
members became of interest to the Palestinian Authority once it started leading an 
openly pro-American foreign policy. The Palestinian leadership’s fear was that it 
would translate into a pro-Israeli stance.  
 However, not much interest is given to Poland alone as a player with its own agenda 
and policy in the region. Poland becomes of interest to the Israeli government and the 
Palestinian Authority as a member of the European Union, able to influence Council 
Conclusions.  
 Israel is well aware of the fact that the United States has more leverage over all the 
different players than any EU member state. So are the Palestinians. Both parties in 
the conflict seem to be solely interested in a greater role of a given country for Public 
Diplomacy purposes, in order to change other members’ positions and sway the 
overall balance in their favor. 
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 In terms of direct negotiations, the PLO and members of the Fatah-led government in 
the West Bank favor a greater involvement of the EU, but as a unified impartial body, 
translating its values grounded in international humanitarian law into policy as 
opposed to 27 separate and contradictory peace initiatives. The Israeli government in 
turn questions the added value of greater Polish involvement in trying to act as a 
mediator in the conflict.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The following report was drafted based on interviews conducted in Poland, Israel, the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory and Jordan. More than 30 interviews were conducted with 
high-level government officials, ambassadors, lower-ranking officials of various 
institutions working on foreign policy, journalists, think-tank employees and non-
governmental organizations workers. 
As a new EU member state, Poland’s interest in the Middle East would gradually 
increase because of the responsibilities that membership imposes. But more important are 
its own ambitions to shape both regional and global policy. This interest is demonstrated 
in Poland’s growing commitment to contribute to the development of the Global South 
and work towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals. Also important are the 
country’s lengthy participation in peacekeeping missions in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the 
Golan as well as its military presence in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Although Poland is not directly part of the Quartet1, it is indirectly involved in the Middle 
East Peace Process by participating in the EU policy. It can thus influence the outcome of 
Council Conclusions and official statements regarding the conflict. However, its 
aspirations seem to lie in playing a bigger role in bilateral relations. Given its good 
relations with both conflicted parties, Poland has shown a certain potential and 
willingness to become a more important player. This paper will examine the elements, 
which make up for Poland’s policy in the Middle East and the potential it yields to 
become a more active player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It will in addition establish 
whether there is a need for Poland’s involvement as a member of the EU and its 
participation’s added value in the context of the new American initiative and the 
Annapolis Peace conference. Generally, the role of Poland as a New Member State in the 
Middle-East conflict will be analysed. The paper will therefore concentrate on the years 
post-enlargement, i.e. 2004-2008.  
  
1. Current Situation – A revival of the Peace Process?  
 
Many EU, American, but also Palestinian and Israeli officials saw a window of 
opportunity in the new developments on the Palestinian internal political scene following 
                                                
1
 The so-called Middle East Quartet includes the United States, United Nations, EU and Russia  
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the dramatic infighting of June 2007 between the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas 
and the Palestinian National Liberation Movement Fatah. In the words of a Palestinian 
official, these are “interesting times” in terms of negotiation prospects2. After a week of 
deadly clashes resulting in over 100 deaths, a bloody cycle of retaliation and scenes of 
torture in Palestinian society, Hamas eventually achieved to take over the Gaza Strip on 
14 June 2007 by attacking the Presidential Compound and the PA security headquarters. 
Later that day, President Mahmoud Abbas dissolved the national unity government – 
brokered by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the hope of reconciliation between the 2 
parties – and appointed a new emergency government headed by the internationally 
recognized Finance Minister Salam Fayyad. In his statement that day, Abu Mazen used 
the strongest language condemning Hamas’ actions denouncing the party as “murderous 
terrorists” and “coup plotters”3. While many Palestinian officials and would agree with 
such a terminology, some point out to the fact that the new “emergency government” 
established by presidential decree is not constitutional since it has not been ratified by the 
parliament and is thus contravening Palestinian law.  
 
Blame is put equally on both parties for demonstrating a lack of responsibility, short-
sidedness and hunger for power, the international community for imposing sanctions on 
the Palestinian Authority (PA) following the 2006 elections and Israel for the continuous 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza despite disengagement. However, the majority of 
the population (85%) would like to see a renewal of negotiations between Hamas and 
Fatah4. It seems indeed, that in the eyes of the Palestinians national reconciliation is more 
important than peace with Israel, where “only” 58 % would like it to happen under 
present circumstances5. This is not to mean that Palestinians are not interested in peace 
with Israel, but according to public opinion, a sustainable agreement would have to 
include Hamas. There is indeed a growing sense of divide between the West Bank and 
Gaza. After the June 2007 events, for West Bankers Gaza is not only a geographically 
separated entity, but the divide has now become mental and thus much deeper. Suffering 
from the physical presence of the Israeli occupation in the form of the Wall, which Israel 
                                                
2
 IPA interview, Palestinian official, Ramallah, August 2007 
3
 Al-Jazeera News, accessed at http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/88F3E3B9-CFFE-4BCB-BC43-
5CD8D72EC138.htm 
4
 FAFO Poll, “Political Chaos Takes its Toll”, 18 July 2007 
5
 Ibidem  
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has been building since 2002, checkpoints and road blocks, the population of the West 
Bank is completely alienated from the plight of the Gazans, especially at a time when 
many think that it is now governed by a “brutal, merciless force”6. However, as much as 
this divide might be profound, any leader trying to reach a deal with Israel while 
compromising Palestinian reconciliation and unity would loose credibility and legitimacy 
since the public would see these actions as a continuation of the Nakba (catastrophe) of 
1948 precisely when Palestinian identity started being defined in terms of dispersion and 
geographical fragmentation7.   
 
Despite the concern of the population for unity, the international community has adopted 
a divisive “West Bank first”8 strategy according to conflict resolution experts. It has 
recognized Salam Fayyad’s government as the only legitimate representative of the 
Palestinian people and supported it with a renewal of direct financial assistance, boosting 
Fatah’s security apparatus and creating a window of opportunity for a negotiation 
process. The rationale is that by creating financial incentives to adhere to the more 
moderate Palestinian leaders, i.e. Fatah, the Palestinians themselves will become more 
pragmatic and eventually Hamas will loose popular support. Indeed, the first signal of 
such an approach was visible in President Bush’s speech on 16 June 2007, in which he 
defined the choice that lays ahead for the Palestinians: the vision of Hamas, which 
“would guarantee chaos, and suffering and the endless perpetuation of grievance”, 
crushing “the possibility of a Palestinian state” diametrically opposed to the one of a 
“peaceful state called Palestine as a homeland for the Palestinian people”, which could be 
achieved “by supporting the reforms of President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad”9. 
Thus, his words were converted into action almost immediately by the United States 
lifting the political and economic embargo on the PA in Ramallah. Additionally, 
President Bush hopes to strengthen Mahmoud Abbas’ popularity by encouraging bilateral 
                                                
6
 IPA interview, Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Chairman PASSIA, August 2007, Jerusalem 
7
 George Giacaman, “Fatah and Hamas will eventually reconcile”, The Daily Star, 24/09/2007 
8
 R. Malley and A. D. Miller, "West Bank First': It Won't Work”, The Washington Post, 18/06/2007 
9
 “President Bush Discusses the Middle East”, 16 July 2007, accessed at 
www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2007/88506.htm.  
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talks with Israel and thereby proving that he is the sole leader, who can deliver peace 
through negotiations10. 
 
It is in this light that one should read the release of 255 prisoners – the vast majority of 
them West Bankers and Fatah-affiliated - from Israeli jails on 20 July 2007, and a recent 
deal negotiated in mid-September 2007 to free another 87, the release of Palestinian tax 
revenues and financial aid allowing to pay the first salaries of civil servants in the West 
Bank in months, as well as the President’s attempts to persuade Israel to ease security 
measures by eliminating some of the checkpoints ruining both Palestinian economy and 
social life11.  
 
Meanwhile, following the Gaza events Israel has shut off the main crossing to Gaza – 
Karni – halting any import and export of raw materials, thus rendering the area even more 
dependent on international handouts. More recently, Israel has declared the Gaza Strip an 
“enemy entity” in retaliation to the firing of Qassam rockets on its territory including one, 
which wounded over 60 soldiers, and announced to take steps, which would contravene 
its bilateral obligations under international humanitarian law towards the civilian 
population. Indeed, it has announced on 19 September to completely “disrupt and/or 
reduce their already limited supply of electricity and fuel”, which constitutes 60 % of 
Gaza’s overall electrical supply12. In addition, Israeli companies directly supply fuel for 
the Gaza Power Plant to generate energy13, thus Israel would only allow enough fuel 
necessary to power electrical generators in hospitals. Similarly, if the firing of rockets 
does not stop, border crossings would only remain open for humanitarian aid, essential 
food and medical supplies – further weakening Gaza’s economy.  
                                                
10
 International Crisis Group, “After Gaza”, Middle East Report N°68, 2 August 2007 
11
 IPA Interview, Palestinian Official, Jericho, August 2007 
12
 After a petition submitted by 10 Israeli and Palestinian human rights organization, the High Court of 
Justice ordered the State Prosecution to present data in order to verify that the government’s move would 
not affect the humanitarian needs of the civilian population. The reaction of the EU to the decision was 
firm, with EU Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner warning against collective 
punishment. 
13
 PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, “Fuelling the Fire: Cutting off Gaza’s Electricity and Fuel”, 
September 2007  
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The imposition of new sanctions coincided with Condoleezza Rice’s visit to the region, 
who immediately expressed her support for Israel’s initiative, confirming that Gaza was 
also a hostile entity to the United States, while reassuring that the United States “will not 
abandon the innocent Palestinians in Gaza”. The discrepancy between diplomatic rhetoric 
and facts on the ground leaves many Arab governments skeptical about the US-brokered 
Annapolis meeting. At the time of writing the report, the interviewees’ major concern 
was that key actors, essential to add legitimacy to the process such as Saudi Arabia were 
reluctant to participate in the conference without an acceptance of the principles set out in 
the Arab Initiative, and therefore no promise of real negotiations. It was suggested that 
the conference would result in declaratory statements, but would not be accompanied by 
a political commitment to create a conducive environment for transforming words into 
actions. Additionally, even countries, which have signed bilateral agreements with Israel, 
such as Jordan and Egypt remained skeptical as two months before the scheduled meeting 
they did not see any real American involvement in the preparation for the talks. Lastly, 
no comprehensive Middle East Peace Process can take place without Syria, which was 
repeatedly declaring its lack of interest in participating in the conference at a time when 
Israel was justifying an air strike on Syrian territory by linking it to Al-Assad’s regime’s 
alleged weapons of mass destruction program. However, despite heavy public criticism 
of the conference, it seems that members of the Arab League Follow-Up Committee14, 
tasked with the promotion of the Arab Peace Initiative could not afford to be absent once 
the decision was taken by the Palestinian leadership to accept the American offer and 
engage in the process. In consequence, they all attended the conference at the ministerial 
level, including Syria, which was represented by a deputy foreign minister.  
 
The climate in Israel in turn seemed to be in favor of the US initiative. In an act of what 
many defined as ‘good will’ Olmert agreed to renew relations with the PA and even met 
with President Abbas in the West Bank town of Jericho. However, the official discourse 
was maintained in the realm of a broad set of declarations focused on a two-state solution 
and peace. The mere concept of final-status issues or the Declaration of Principles based 
                                                
14
 The Arab League Follow-Up Committee is comprised of the Arab League Secretariat, Algeria, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
Yemen 
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on the Clinton Parameters15 seemed to be taboo adding further doubts in Palestine as to 
whether Israel is genuinely interested in peace.  
 
The Gaza takeover emphasized the need for reaching lasting peace in the Middle East in 
“conformity with the Roadmap”. As a direct result, Tony Blair was appointed as Special 
Envoy to the Middle East Quartet.  The decision was welcomed with enthusiasm in Israel 
and within certain political circles in Palestine, leaving however the population skeptical 
due to his involvement in the invasion of Iraq. Tony Blair was given the mandate to help 
Palestinian institution-building by mobilizing international assistance in cooperation with 
donors and “developing plans to promote Palestinian economic development, including 
private sector partnerships”16, while working towards the implementation of past 
agreements on access and movement. Many however suspect – and hope – that Blair will 
interpret his mandate in a way which will allow more room for diplomacy17. 
 
EU reaction to the Gaza Takeover  
 
The EU’s official stance did not differ much from the American and Israeli position. On 
18 June, European foreign ministers welcomed and supported the Palestinian President’s 
decision to proclaim an “emergency government”, isolate Hamas both economically and 
politically and “resume normal relations with the Palestinian Authority”18 in Ramallah. 
Additionally, EU ministers stressed the need to continue their programme of 
humanitarian assistance in Gaza. On July 7th, the EU took the decision to continue its 
                                                
15
 Five months after the failure of the Camp David negotiations in 2000, President Clinton  has put forth 
parameters for a comprehensive Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement, to which both Prime Minister Ehud 
Barak and Chairman of the PLO Yassir Arafat have agreed (with reservations) as a basis for future 
negotiations. The Clinton Parameters set out a framework for all permanent status issues and envisaged 
territorial land swaps, dismantling settlements without settlement blocs, a vision for Jerusalem as the 
capital of both states, international presence in the Jordan Valley and a just solution to the Palestinian 
refugee problem including return to a Palestinian state, Israel or repatriation to a third country and financial 
compensations.  
16
 “Quartet Representative - Quartet Statement”, 27 June 2007, accessed at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/declarations/94996.pdf 
17
 IPA Interview, EC official, Tel Aviv, August 2007  
18
 Council of the European Union, PRESS RELEASE 2809th Council meeting General Affairs and 
External Relations, Luxembourg, 18 June 2007 
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European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in Rafah in a fully operational 
mode, while downsizing its staff19.  
 
The post-Gaza discourse flowing out of Brussels was in line with the Quartet’s stance - 
one of optimism, hope and windows of opportunities, negotiations and the peace process. 
There seems to be however more understanding as to the consequences of a divisive 
policy towards the Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and Gaza. In an open letter to 
Tony Blair, and published in “Le Monde” on 10 July, 10 foreign ministers of 
Mediterranean member states20 affirmed that the Hamas takeover of Gaza could 
paradoxically create hope and progress as it has created a new awareness of the extent of 
the crisis in Palestine:  
 
“The risk of a civil war in the West Bank, threats of partition of Palestine 
and the come back of Jordanian and Egyptian scenarios pre-1967 could 
indeed bring a change. Through his determination to favour peace and 
dialogue, to courageously denounce terrorism, the President of the 
Palestinian Authority is an invitation for optimism”. 
 
The ministers continued to clarify that their primary objectives are: to provide hope and a 
genuine solution for the people of the region by resuming final status negotiations, 
ensuring Israel’s security by exploring the possibility of an international peacekeeping 
force accompanied by a political process and based on an inter-Palestinian agreement, 
pressuring Israel to implement policies bolstering Mahmoud Abbas by releasing 
thousands of prisoners and Palestinian leaders and freezing settlements. Lastly, they 
warned about the risk of an escalation of violence in the Strip should the Gaza crossings 
with Israel to the north and Egypt to the south remain completely closed. Additionally, 
they called for Saudi Arabia and Egypt to help broker reconciliation between Hamas and 
Fatah - in other words, they essentially called for a return to the principles set out in the 
Mecca Agreement of March 2007.  
 
                                                
19
 European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah, “EU decides to maintain EUBAM”, 7 July 2007 
http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/portal/en/node/352  
20
 The 10 member states, which signed the letter, are: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Romania and Slovenia.  
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As much as there is optimism in Brussels, there seems to be much more scepticism on the 
ground among EU officials reporting on the daily situation in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (OPT). The decision to embrace Salam Fayyad’s new government and lift 
economic sanctions however, have paradoxically provided a disincentive for Fatah to 
reconcile with Hamas, as it presumes that such a situation would lead to assistance being 
cut-off once again and the restricted contact policy re-implemented. According to EU 
officials on the ground, the political climate in Ramallah is such that reconciliation is not 
conceivable in the near future21. Furthermore, in their eyes, via a policy of no-contact 
with Hamas in Gaza, the EU’s long-term objectives outlined in the Road Map, i.e. 
“building the institutions of a democratic, independent and viable Palestinian state, living 
in peace and security with Israel22” are being eroded on a daily basis inevitably leading to 
more radicalization. While humanitarian assistance is crucial in order to prevent the 
collapse of the PA and a full-scale humanitarian crisis, it is not sustainable and only 
responds to short-term political decisions. Unfortunately, this trend is a reverse of the EU 
and Quartet’s goals set out in the Road Map, i.e. institutional reform and development.  
 
The momentum, which was being built towards the November conference at the time of 
writing this report – a US-led initiative and seen by many as the revival of the peace 
process – seemed “surreal in some ways, because it ignored the fact that Gaza is 
controlled by an entity, which nobody wants to talk to23”.  Even if Mahmoud Abbas and 
Ehud Olmert negotiated a final status agreement, the Gaza question and the issue of 
power-sharing on the Palestinian political scene would still remain.  In such a context, 
what is the EU and Poland’s potential to influence negotiations? Similarly, what is 
expected of them by both sides – Palestinians and Israelis in respect to the conflict? 
Before providing an answer to these questions, it is worth looking into EU involvement 
in the Peace Process from a historical perspective. 
 
2. EU Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Long-Term Goals vs. Short-
Term Political Decisions 
                                                
21
 IPA Interview, EC official, Jerusalem 2007. 
22European Commission website, accessed at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/gaza/intro/index.htm#2.3 
23
 IPA Interview, EC official, Jerusalem 2007  
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Due to geographic proximity, concern for its own security and stability, historic ties or 
“moral debt” towards the Middle East, Europe could never afford to stay away from a 
conflict taking place at its door step. However, it is not until 1980 and the Venice 
Declaration that member states agreed on a unified position and expressed their support 
to Palestinian self-determination, while accepting the PLO as a partner in negotiations24. 
In this document settlements became not only an obstacle to peace, but illegal under 
international law. Throughout the years, the EU built on the Venice Declaration and 
eventually developed a clear position towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict supporting a 
two state solution and a policy made up of declaratory diplomacy, commercial ties and 
the promotion of its values of democracy, political reform and the rule of law through 
development assistance. As one of the members of the Quartet, the European Union 
officially asserts today that it is committed to “improving the humanitarian and economic 
situation of the Palestinians, whilst at the same time supporting the Roadmap principles 
of building the institutions of a democratic, independent and viable Palestinian state, 
living in peace and security with Israel25”. Furthermore, its position is clear and unified 
on some of the principles underlying the conflict: it equally condemns terrorism, the 
expansion of settlements, the construction of the West Bank wall and restrictions on 
movement. What differs among its member states is the ways in which these issues are 
addressed in terms of declaratory diplomacy.  However in recent times, the role of the EU 
is growing in terms of political and financial involvement. One such example is the 
Temporary International Mechanism, which was designed by the Commission in order to 
channel aid directly to the Palestinian people – as opposed to transferring funds to the 
government’s Single Treasury Account - after the political embargo was imposed on the 
Hamas-led government26. Additionally, the EU convinced the United States to endorse its 
aid plan. Consequently, expectations are also increasing regarding the EU’s involvement 
                                                
24
 European Community, “Venice Declaration on the Middle East”, 12-13 June 1980, accessed at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/mepp/decl/index.htm#10 
 
25
 European Commission website, accessed at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/gaza/intro/index.htm#2.3 
26
 Despite the embargo on direct assistance to the Palestinian Authority, the European Union delivered 
significantly more assistance in 2006 and 2007 than in previous years. Most of the funds were channeled 
through the Temporary International Mechanism, UNRWA and NGO’s, and responded to humanitarian 
needs of the population. 
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in the region’s affairs. These expectations are expressed primarily by the Palestinian side, 
which considers itself as the weaker and more vulnerable side in the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict27. The Palestinians view the EU as a possible counterweight to the United States 
and a more objective power, although the interviewees have repeatedly pointed to a 
cooperation of the EU and United States through the Middle East Quartet.  
 
At the beginning of the Peace Process at both the Madrid Conference in 1991 and in Oslo 
in 1993, the EU was not represented at all. Its role remained limited to broad declarations, 
while American diplomacy spearheaded negotiations and ensured contact between both 
parties of the conflict. Such European invisibility on the Middle Eastern political scene - 
despite the EU’s obvious interest in the region – can be attributed to two main reasons. 
Firstly, its internal lack of cohesion in respect to foreign policy despite efforts to simplify 
its formulation and implementation by appointing the High Representative of the EU 
through the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. Secondly, both the Palestinian and the Israeli 
leaderships blindly believed in the United States’ mediation power. The Palestinians view 
the Americans as the main player, who has leverage over Israel; whereas the Israelis 
believe that the Americans have their best interest in mind and consider them as their 
primary ally in the region. Thus, for years during the Peace Process Israel preferred to 
maintain a purely economic relationship with the EU, while investing in the United States 
politically. By signing the Euro-Med Association Agreement in 1995 Israel has arguably 
fulfilled its strategic goal. According to EU officials, Israel knows that this agreement 
will never be suspended since the outcome would be a political problem28 for the EU. 
Such a position limits the leverage which the EU possesses with Israel.  
 
The end of an American monopoly on the peace process and its internationalization was 
spawned by the failure of Camp David in 2000, and the change of administrations in the 
United States. Whereas Bill Clinton was determined “to devote as much of his presidency 
                                                
27
 This argument was underlined in all IPA interviews conducted with Palestinian officials and experts. 
28
 According to Tocci (2005), the EU considers maintaining its ties in the Mediterranean as extremely 
important politically and economically. As no country in the Barcelona Process has a prefect human rights 
recording, the suspension of the Association Agreement with Israel would be a precedent, which could lead 
to an eventual suspension of all agreements.   
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as it took to make the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations succeed”29 and insisted on the 
urgency of the matter, the Bush administration was since 9/11 more preoccupied with the 
Global War on Terror. Such a change in geopolitics arguably provided an opportunity for 
the internationalization of negotiations through the creation of the Quartet in 2002 of 
which the EU is a full member. Thus, the EU High Representative Javier Solana became 
much more visible in the region since he first took part in the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit, 
following the failure of Camp David in 2000. A year later, the role of the EU increased 
with the presence of the EU's special envoy to the peace process, Miguel Moratinos and 
his aides as the only “outsiders at the Taba Hotel”. Although the EU did not oversee the 
negotiations directly, Moratinos interviewed both negotiation teams immediately after the 
talks on the basis of which he wrote an unofficial document presenting both positions on 
the final status issues and exposing the differences30. In general, since the beginning of 
his tenure in 1996 Moratinos played an important role in being in close contact on a 
regular basis with all the parties in the conflict and trying to bridge the gap between 
narratives. As for his successor, Marc Otte, he took on new responsibilities since the 
situation on the ground changed in 2005 after the Gaza disengagement. Apart from the 
traditional reporting functions or the promotion of dialogue between parties and 
initiatives leading to a final agreement, Otte became heavily involved in the reform of the 
Palestinian security sector through EUPOLCOPPS31 and the monitoring of international 
agreements through the EUBAM mission at the Rafah crossing. 
Furthermore, the EU together with other Quartet members sponsored the Road Map, 
which it initiated in 2002 under the Danish Presidency32.  
 
Despite its historical evolution, an often depiction of the European Union’s role in the 
Middle East Peace Process is the one of a payer as opposed to a player33. As the largest 
donor to the Palestinian Authority (PA) since the advent of the Oslo era, the EU has been 
                                                
29
 Agha, H. and Malley, R. (2001) “Camp David: Tragedy of Errors”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 31, 
No. 1, pp. 62-85 
30
 Eldar Akiva, “Moratinos Document -  The peace that nearly was at Taba”, Haaretz, 14 February 2002  
31
 EU Police Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support  
32
 Tocci, Nathalie (2005) “The Widening Gap between Rhetoric and Reality in EU Policy towards the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, CEPS Working Document, Nr. 217/January 2005 
33
 IPA interview, Mahdi Abdul Hadi, Chairman, PASSIA, September 2007, Jerusalem. 
 The statement that the “European Union is a payer, not a player” was reiterated by most Israeli and 
Palestinian interviewees. The first person to formulate this view however, is believed to be Prime Minister 
Ariel Sharon.  
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tirelessly attempting to build peace between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as the 
foundations of a viable Palestinian state, precisely through aid34. However, due to the 
failure of the Camp David Summit and in response the break out of the Al-Aqsa intifada, 
it has been repeatedly suggested that rather than exerting its economic leverage through 
either positive or negative conditionality in order to play a bigger part in the political 
peace process, the EU has in fact become a subsidizer for the Israeli occupation. As such, 
it has arguably taken away some of the occupying power’s responsibilities vis-à-vis the 
occupied population under international law.  
 
Indeed, it is estimated that grants and loans given by the EU and its member states 
amounted to more than 6 billion euros during 1994-2006, an average of 500 million euros 
a year35. Almost one third of this sum was used to support UNRWA’s36 work in assisting 
Palestinian refugees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while the remaining amount 
has been utilized to finance development projects through Palestinian non-governmental 
organizations, humanitarian aid as well as direct budget support of the PA37. 
Notwithstanding the boycott of the PA since Hamas won the legislative elections in 
January 2006 and the imposition of economic embargo, both the European Commission 
and EU member states provided approximately 700 million euros in indirect aid in 2006 
alone. The common criticism – Palestinian and European alike – of the EU’s policy 
towards the conflict is that the money and resources spent on Palestinian state-making, 
institution-building and humanitarian aid does not translate into a more visible political 
role of the EU in the Middle East. In addition, many point out the fact that short-term 
political actions, such as the decision to boycott the Hamas government in January 2006, 
in fact are damaging to the EU long-term goals. While EU assistance started shifting to 
development projects and institutional reform, it relapsed back to humanitarian aid after 
the economic and political embargo was imposed. Such a tough stance however, did not 
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have a merely economic effect; it affected people’s trust in the EU’s good will as well as 
the whole process of reform, transformation and the belief in principles of democracy.  
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3. Poland’s Policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
 
The Middle East increasingly is becoming an important area of Poland’s concern. Under 
communism, Poland led a pro-Arab policy. Since 1989 however, it is conducting a policy 
of “equal distance” as several officials stressed. This policy has not changed in spite of 
the different governments that have held office in the last seventeen years and Poland’s 
accession to the European Union. Poland does not have an ambition to conduct an 
independent Middle East policy, but being the largest out of all New Member States, it is 
aware of its particular role in the European Union. The traditionally good relations with 
Arab countries in particular as well as the historic ties with Israel sometimes create the 
temptation to play a much greater role in conflict resolution. Unofficially Poland has 
declared several times its willingness to engage in mediations. But, as one Polish official 
said maintaining “equal distance” and good relations with both parties is not enough. 
Palestinians welcomed Polish attempts while Israel was not interested in the initiative. 
Israel hopes for Poland to establish a greater pro-Israeli role in EU institutions. In the 
eyes of Israel the European Union is perceived as supporting the Palestinian cause while 
Poland and the Czech Republic who are the strongest US allies among New Member 
States, are thus potential Israeli allies. But according to Israeli officials38 Poland has to 
learn first how to effectively operate in EU institutions and express its opinions. Poland 
has to be more active and work together with other New Member States, for example 
through the Visegrad Group. A collective voice is better heard than a single one. To sum 
up, the enlargement did not change democratically the EU’s role in the Middle East 
although both sides feel they got new support for their policies. Israel feels that it has 
more allies among the pro-American New Member States. Arab states, including the 
Palestinian Authority, still remember and appreciate pro-Arab policies, which those 
countries used to conduct. Consequently, the Palestinians try to convince the Polish 
government that they have better contacts in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon than the United 
States and therefore better inside information on potential developments.  Poland needs 
the Palestinians if it wants to play bigger role in the Middle East and the EU. Also, Polish 
officials agree with this argument:  
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“The Poles could influence Middle Eastern affairs through the Palestinians. 
The Palestinians would give us the opportunity to enter many areas. We 
could get through to places, where we are not necessarily perceived as 
partners (in the Gulf for example), in regions, where they [the Palestinians] 
have good commercial ties. Overall, there is a Polish presence in the region, 
but there is no policy. We do not take full advantage of this potential.” 39 
 
Poland officially supports the Middle East Quartet’s efforts of reaching a solution, 
leading eventually to the creation of 2 states living in peace and security within 
internationally recognized borders. Thus, understandably Poland’s reaction to the Gaza 
takeover was in line with the EU position declaring that the “bloody coup undertaken by 
Hamas deserves condemnation in the strongest words”. Consequently, it was wary to 
declare that the resumption of any sort of dialogue with the Islamist movement would 
depend on its fulfillment of conditions imposed by the Quartet – renouncing terrorism, 
recognizing Israel and previous agreements40. It thus took a stance more in line with the 
United States and distanced itself from Southern countries, which expressed their concern 
for a degree of reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah.  
  
Furthermore, it recognized the urgency of security sector reform as well as governmental 
economic reforms leading to the betterment of living conditions in the Territory. It 
welcomed the transfer of tax revenues and the release of Palestinian prisoners calling it “a 
positive signal on Israel’s side”, as well as the readiness of the Arab League to cooperate 
with Israel, which it hopes will contribute to a solution. In addition, Poland gave its full 
support to Tony Blair, since it believes that through his expertise in Middle Eastern 
politics, he will have the ability to engage the Quartet constructively in the region. 
Similarly, according to the official Polish stance, the Annapolis peace conference is seen 
as a crucial initiative for the renewal of the peace process. Poland however stressed the 
necessity of both Saudi Arabia and Israel to participate in the conference for it to be able 
to succeed. Lastly, Poland believes in the restoration of peace initiatives and broken 
relations between Israeli and Palestinian communities, through the reestablishment of 
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economic, cultural and academic cooperation, which it seeks to pursue through a trilateral 
Palestinian-Israeli-Polish dialogue. In terms of development aid, preference is given to 
projects, which involve cooperation between Palestinian NGO’s and Israeli partners – 
both at the governmental and non-governmental level, in order to restoring trust locally.  
Do these statements go beyond rhetoric and translate into action and real policy 
implemented on the ground? What are the instruments deployed by Poland in order to 
pursue its goals?  
 
Currently, two major components make up for Polish policy in the Middle East: its 
military presence and peacekeeping missions, as well as development aid, which it has 
been deploying since its integration into the European Union.  
 
Military Presence  
   
Although no external power is directly involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, any 
military involvement in the Middle East is relevant to a given country’s policy towards it, 
due to the regional dynamics and the influence all crises exert on each other. There is no 
doubt that the war in Iraq has changed regional alliances and thus influenced the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict externally. It has successfully achieved to deepen the Sunni-Shiite 
divide not only in Iraq but also in other Middle Eastern states, as well as among non-state 
actors. In addition, according to Abdul Hadi, the images of sectarian violence have had a 
tremendous effect on the Palestinian society internally. The brutalization of the 
Palestinian street, kidnappings and acts of retaliation between members of Hamas and 
Fatah as seen in the Gaza Strip are a recent phenomenon, previously non-existent in a 
highly politicized society fighting for the common goal of statehood. How has Poland’s 
military presence in the region affected the conflict? Has it had any effect at all? 
 
Although, it is conventionally believed that as a strategic ally of the US in Europe, 
Poland’s policy is solely pro-American most decision-makers assert that it is a mixture of 
pure pragmatism and EU-driven agenda. Poland has expressed its political support to the 
US-led military intervention against Iraq in March 2003. This support materialized in the 
deployment of 2500 Polish troops, which were primarily used for the stabilization and 
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reconstruction of the country and incorporated in the Multinational Division Center-
South. Soon, the Polish contingent was made responsible for a zone consisting of 5 
provinces – Babil, Karbala, Diwaniya, Najaf and Wasit – patrolling the region and 
providing security training to the Iraqi army. While the security situation has been since 
then constantly worsening, reaching a stage that many define as “civil war” and the 
number of US troops has been increasing, the Polish government took the decision – 
along with other European actors involved - to downsize its contingent first to 1500 and 
as of March 2006 to 900 troops. This decision stemmed from two main concerns: to limit 
Poland’s involvement in military operations and to allow the Iraqi army to gradually take 
over the responsibility for security. The main reasons behind Poland’s involvement in the 
conflict were both political and economic. At the time of the invasion, there was a lot of 
hope that the military presence would result in Polish companies’ extensive participation 
in the reconstruction of Iraq on the one hand, and American investments in Poland 
accompanied by the strengthening of the political alliance on the other.  
After the 2007 parliamentary elections in Poland the government was made up by the 
pro-European Civic Platform and the Polish Peasant Party. They both agreed that Polish 
troops will be withdrawn from Iraq in 2008. The main reason underlying that decision 
was a growing opposition of political parties and public opinion against the war in Iraq, 
as well as a conviction of officials that the intervention is coming to an end. Many 
countries have withdrawn from Iraq already, Poland being one of the few still present 
there. Even though Poland sent the largest number of troops following the American and 
British contingents, the government of the United States did not translate such a 
commitment into a more privileged relationship with Poland.  
 
There is a feeling amongst Polish officials that the sole participation in the stabilizing 
mission in Iraq has put the country on the Middle Eastern map as “an important player” 
and gained the respect of Arab governments, which in the view of one interviewee “are 
fond of power” 41. The overall feeling in policy-making circles in Warsaw is that Poland’s 
military presence in the region is well-perceived and welcome among Arab countries 
because of its respect for culture and religion. Such an apparent acceptance does not 
however translate into better economic relations. Surprisingly, there does not seem to be 
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much questioning of what military involvement means for the region itself and the 
security of its people, rather it is perceived in terms of how Poland’s interests can be 
ensured. 
 
Indeed, Polish policy in the Middle East seems to be driven by its military presence in the 
region, either in Iraq or as part of peacekeeping mission in Lebanon and Syria. In the 
words of a Polish official “they are Poland’s biggest asset: the more missions, the bigger 
Poland’s involvement in international and EU policy towards the region. They increase 
its credibility as an EU member and strengthen its position”42. Following this line of 
reasoning and its desire to take part in shaping EU and international policy towards the 
Middle East, Poland strengthened its military presence as part of UNIFIL II in South 
Lebanon after the end of the 2006 war. The Ministry’s official stance is that it responded 
to an EU call to support a UN resolution implementing a cease-fire between the Israeli 
army and Hezbollah. Thus, Poland increased its troops from 180 to 500 soldiers. 
However, the number remains too small - the total military personnel is 13,349 – for 
Poland to impose its visibility, play a bigger bilateral role or mediate between Israel and 
Lebanon. This does not even seem to be its ambition. When asked for the reason of 
Poland’s involvement, Polish decision-makers assert that they complied with an EU 
policy of concern for Israel’s security by monitoring the border and care for Lebanon’s 
post-war reconstruction. Poland’s involvement in military and peacekeeping missions 
seems to be primarily driven by the desire to secure its own political and economic 
interests as an EU member, rather than fulfilling a broader security agenda. Indeed, a 
military official compared Poland’s participation in UNIFIL to a peacekeeping mission in 
Chad, where 150 Polish troops will be integrated as part of a French contingent43. On the 
one hand, it seems to respond to responsibilities imposed by membership rather than a 
particular interest in the region. On the other, it explores the benefits of such an 
involvement – be they economic by increasing Polish export or diplomatic by ensuring 
the country’s visibility on the international political scene. Thus, it is primarily perceived 
as a pragmatic actor, rather than one, which complies with US policies.   
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Development Aid 
The Polish government has the potential to shape to some extent the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict through bilateral relations, which it has established with both the PA and Israel. 
In the case of Israel they take the form of contractual relations in the areas of trade, 
technology, security industry or culture and academia. In the case of the Palestinians this 
relationship expresses itself more often than not in the form of development aid due to 
the absence of an independent state and degrading humanitarian conditions. Additionally, 
there seems to be an understanding amongst government officials that Poland should 
exert leverage over the conflict precisely through its development assistance, i.e. either 
through positive or negative conditionality.  
 
This suggests firstly that although there is declared even-handedness towards the conflict, 
a concern for balance and equality of treatment of the two parties, the general view is in 
line with the principles outlined in the 2003 Road Map for Peace that the PA needs to 
undergo changes before any agreement with Israel is reached. Secondly, the highly 
politicized nature of aid is a way for Poland to impose its own policies in compliance 
with the EU agenda. Such policy is even more visible in Poland since the 2005 elections 
when both president Kaczyński and the centrist Law and Justice (Prawo i 
Sprawiedliwość) got into power. According to a Polish diplomat, Poland’s political right 
is rather pro-Israeli, for obvious historical reasons on the one hand and ideology defining 
the style of governance on the other: “Kaczyński likes the fact that Israel has a similar 
vision of a strong country and ‘state democracy’, which puts a strong emphasis on 
security44”. This fondness seems to be reciprocal with Israel officially supporting 
Poland’s participation in the UNIFIL II peacekeeping mission in South Lebanon and 
praising its military presence in Iraq as a commitment to ensuring regional and more 
importantly international security45. 
 
By integrating into the EU structures, Poland had to convert from a recipient of aid into a 
donor country. As soon as October 2003, the Council of Ministers adopted a “Strategy for 
Poland’s Development Cooperation” and by the end of 2004 UNDP Poland together with 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched the “Millennium Development Goals Time to 
Help Others” public awareness campaign setting out the goals for the country’s Official 
Development Assistance (ODA). In terms of money spent on development aid, here again 
Poland complies with EU obligations, which expected it to amount to 0.1% of Polish 
GDP in 2006 and raise to 0.17 % of GDP by 201046. Apart from political, ethical, socio-
economic or state security reasons for involvement in a global commitment to 
cooperation and development, Poland’s reasons stem also from its modern history and the 
assistance it received in carrying out structural reforms and transformation in the 1990’s. 
According to the official assistance strategy set out in 2003, Poland’s priorities are 
countries in the process of structural change especially in Eastern and Southern Europe 
and those, with which Poland enjoys a high degree of political, commercial and cultural 
ties. In addition, it is committed to assisting countries in need of humanitarian aid and 
activities designed to prevent deadly conflict and serving state security. Realizing both, 
its limited experience in ODA and resources in comparison to other donors, Poland 
decided to reduce its intervention to the following core areas: health, science and 
education, water and sanitation, protection of the environment, capacity building, 
supporting democratic institutions and transboundary cooperation47. In addition, it 
decided to specialize in areas, where it could make a valuable contribution and its 
involvement would be considered added value. One such example are Poland’s efforts in 
the Palestinian Territory, which concentrate on trilateral initiatives aiming to bring 
Palestinians and Israelis together. The Poles are trying to export their own transformation 
and reconciliation experience, which is why Poland has repeatedly offered its own 
expertise in socio-political reforms, good governance, human rights, educational reform, 
civil society.  
In 2007, 9 countries were identified as a priority. These include Belarus which received 7 
million euros in assistance, Ukraine with 4 million euros, followed by Afghanistan (2,1 
million euros), Georgia, Moldova, Tanzania and finally Angola, the Palestinian Territory 
and Iraq, which were allocated 500 000 euros each. Assistance was channeled both 
through NGO funded projects and Polish foreign missions. A separate Small Grants Fund 
was allocated solely to African countries. The fact that Eastern and Southern European 
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countries were given most of the funding should come as no surprise since the decision is 
compliant with the 2003 official development assistance strategy. Iraq and Afghanistan 
also come as obvious choices due to the presence of Polish troops in those countries. The 
rationale for aiding the remaining countries however, is compliant with EU requirements. 
Angola and Tanzania have been identified as countries in need of assistance based on the 
new EU strategy for Africa, which was adopted at the end of 2005 and which aims to 
help the continent in reaching the Millennium Development Goals. The increase of Polish 
aid to the Palestinian Territory (from a mere 130 000 euros in 2005 to 500 000 in 2006 
and 2007) was firstly a direct response to the decision taken by the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council of the EU (GAERC) on 10 April 2006 to meet the basic needs 
of the Palestinian population and address the worsening humanitarian situation. Secondly, 
the assistance is justified by traditionally good relations between “Poland and the 
Palestinian people”48  
 
In the face of wars, which have taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of people as in 
Darfur or the Congo, one might wonder why the Palestinian Territory, where a relatively 
low-intensity conflict is taking place, was identified as a priority by Polish ODA. On the 
one hand, Poland’s involvement in the region stems from its political ambitions: any 
state, which has aspirations to be recognized as a player in international relations wants to 
be somewhat involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict for Public Diplomacy purposes. As 
cynical as it may sound, before bringing about real change, development aid grants 
visibility49.On the other, there is genuine conviction among some officials working on the 
ground that Poland has a role to play and can bring a fresh perspective because of its 
“special alliance” with Israel and traditionally good relations with Arab states50. The 
decision to establish bilateral relations with the PA first came about in 2000, but it is not 
until 2004 that a Polish Representative Office was established in Ramallah, due to the 
break out of the second Intifada. Other new EU members however, such as the Czech 
Republic and Hungary have opened Representative offices as early as 1999 and 2000, 
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which did not grant Poland a monopoly on relations with the PA among the Visegrad 
Group of states, as some would have wanted.  
 
In 2007, Poland funded mostly projects in the realm of water and sanitation, education, 
health and micro-projects, most of them implemented by the Polish Humanitarian 
Organization in cooperation with local counterparts. In addition, it also provided direct 
assistance to refugees via a grant to UNRWA.  Its real interest however lies in 
strengthening the “peace fabric” by facilitating cross-cultural dialogue between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis, modeled after Polish reconciliation with Ukraine and 
Germany. How is this involvement perceived by the beneficiaries themselves? 
 
4. The Palestinian Narrative  
As a recipient of European assistance, Palestine has become an example of peace 
building through aid rather than a result of political and natural social processes. It thus 
became a product of multiple and conflicting agendas of donors, with its political and 
economic needs being somewhat marginalized.  While there is recognition that the EU 
aspires to be a stronger partner in the Middle East, the overall assumption is that it has 
become a “payer not a player”, which is unable or unwilling to translate the money it 
spends to achieve its goals in Israel and Palestine into real political leverage51.  An often 
reiterated public perception is that by spending millions of euros on an annual basis on 
projects aiming at improving the lives of the Palestinians the EU is effectively 
subsidizing the Israeli occupation, taking away Israel’s responsibility under international 
law.  
Interviewees have often cited the destruction of EU-funded infrastructure projects by the 
Israeli army as such an example. The EC has most recently estimated the damage done by 
Israel to EU-funded projects in the Palestinian Territory to amount to 44 million euros52. 
These include: the destruction of the runway at Gaza International Airport, bombing of 
the Gaza seaport and offices of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the building 
and studio of the Palestine Broadcasting Corporation during the Ramallah incursion and 
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laboratories used for a counter-terrorism program – to quote a few53. At the height of the 
cycle of violence, during which most of these facilities were damaged (2001-2002), the 
then External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten, excluded any legal or political action 
against Israel claiming that the process would be extremely difficult for 2 main reasons. 
Firstly, the internal structure of the EU would hamper the process of compensation, since 
projects are not only channeled through the Commission, but also through member states. 
Second, upon completion a project becomes the legal property of the people it is 
supposed to benefit, making EU legal action almost impossible. Thus, the EU limited 
itself to verbal condemnation and balanced statements, best exemplified in the words of 
Chris Patten:  
 
"While we condemn savage attacks on Israeli people without any 
reservation, we at the same time question whether some of the targeting of 
development projects [by Israeli forces] makes any conceivable sense. It is 
quite difficult to know how driving a bulldozer up and down the runway in 
Gaza will make it less likely for young men and women to strap bombs to 
themselves and murder people in Tel Aviv." 
 
The Palestinians however, would have wanted the EU to take a political stance and “ask 
for its money back”, by using the leverage it has over Israel through the EU-Israel 
Association Agreement guarantying it economic benefits. They point out the fact that 
such action has been taken in the past in respect to imposing taxation on settlers’ 
products54. Even though some voices within the European Parliament traditionally seen 
as pro-Palestinian have gone so far as to call for the suspension of that agreement at a UN 
conference, which took place in Brussels in September 2007 as a protest of human rights 
violation in the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians are quite disillusioned. They are 
conscious that a consensus within an ever growing EU representing conflicting agendas 
would not be reached for such a decision to be imposed. Many Palestinian interviewees 
have repeated that the EU is compromising its values and principles of respect for human 
rights – included in Article 2 of the Association Agreement for instance – precisely when 
it comes to Israel. According to Abdul Hadi “people are too shy and reluctant to 
challenge Israelis on anything. Not because of the Holocaust and the legacy of the Jewish 
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Question in Europe, but because of the United States”55. Indeed, according to the 
Palestinian narrative, the question of the role of the EU or new member states in the 
conflict seems inseparable from the overwhelming position of the US in the Middle East.  
 
Israel’s privileged relationship with the United States is well known. However, according 
to the Palestinian narrative it is not only this partnership, which drives American policy 
towards the Middle East and in consequence affects the conflict. It is suggested that the 
American agenda has been based for the last 6 years on what Abdul Hadi defines as the 5 
“I’s”, namely Islamophobia, which developed after 9/11, Iraq, Iran, Israel and finally 
Intelligence56. The United States hijacked the Quartet in order to pursue its own agenda 
in the region, which in turn has huge repercussions on the ways in which the conflict is 
now perceived and thus attempted at being resolved. Whereas there was no doubt that the 
first Intifada (1987-93) was grounded in a struggle for statehood and national liberation57, 
the second upheaval launched by the Palestinians after an effective failure of the Peace 
Process with the collapse of negotiation talks in 2000, remains misunderstood as a cycle 
of endless religious violence and terrorism. Palestinians themselves are partly responsible 
for such a perception, compromising the moral dimension of their struggle with suicide 
attacks against Israeli civilian population and the high islamization of their political 
scene. It is no coincidence that the second Intifada is also called the Al-Aqsa intifada, in 
reference to one of the holiest sites of Islam and as such making many believe that 
religion is in fact the source of the conflict. However, the discourse imposed by the 
United States post-9/11 has inevitably influenced the ways in which the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is dealt with. By hijacking the Quartet with the 5 “I’s”, the 
Palestinians have been subjected to international and regional agendas and rivalries.  
 
Perception of New Members 
 
Overall, Palestinians welcome EU involvement in the areas of democracy, institution and 
capacity building, education, waste water management and the environment, technical 
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assistance as well as its strong commitment to human rights. However, they would like 
humanitarian assistance and development programs to be complemented by a more 
prominent political role of the EU in the region. The primary reason cited for Palestinian 
“under-development” is not the lack of resources, entrepreneurship or a culture of aid 
dependency, rather a political environment and restrictions on movement, which hamper 
human and social development58. This is clearly a dilemma of development under 
occupation.  
 
As mentioned above, Palestinians would like the EU to use its economic and 
technological partnership with Israel as a way of pressuring the latter to conform to 
international humanitarian law and convince it to go back to genuine final status talks. 
They point out the fact that settlements have literally doubled in size during the era of the 
Oslo peace process and that despite the International Court of Justice’s ruling in 2004,  
declaring the wall in the West Bank as illegal, Israel continued its construction for 
another three years. In addition, the current restriction apparatus in the West Bank and 
Gaza prevents the development of the Palestinian economy: there are currently 532 
roadblocks in the West Bank alone, by which Israel is violating the Agreement on 
Movement and Access brokered by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, European 
High Representative Javier Solana and the previous Quartet Representative James 
Wolfensohn and signed between Israel and the PA in 200559. Due to the damaging effects 
that the status quo has on the Palestinian Territory’s economic situation as well as on its 
long-term national aspirations, negotiations are a matter of highest urgency to the 
Palestinians. Arguably, it is the opposite for Israel. In the view of Palestinian officials, 
Israel’s strategic interests lie in fuelling a low-intensity conflict and thus having the 
opportunity to create “irreversible facts on the ground”.60 
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Until recently, Palestinian officials had virtually no interest in new EU member states. 
Given their history and affiliation with the Soviet bloc during the Cold war, Eastern 
European countries were for a long time taken for granted as traditionally pro-Arab and 
pro-Palestinian. The legacy of business cooperation as well as numerous academic 
scholarships and traineeships have long benefited Poland, in particular, a good reputation 
among Palestinians. In addition, its lack of colonial past is perceived as an asset in a 
region, which still struggles with the effects of postcolonialism. As a country, which 
fought for freedom itself and experienced structural transformation, Poland comes to the 
Middle East without the legacy of imperialism ascribed to European powers such as the 
UK, France or Spain, which renders its involvement less problematic in the eyes of 
Islamist groups. Paradoxically, Poland’s military presence in Iraq has given it relative 
visibility, but has not put it on the map of Islamist organizations fighting against a 
renewed imperialism. As for Palestinian negotiators concentrating their efforts on 
winning over the Americans along with key European states such as France, UK and 
Germany, new EU members became of interest once they explicitly started a pro-
American foreign policy. As such, there is concern that these countries will shift EU 
policy towards Israel. Officials in the Negotiations Affairs Department have asserted that 
they are now trying to target these countries through diplomatic meetings with 
representatives’ offices in Ramallah as well as advocacy tools such as briefings and 
presentations. In addition, there is eagerness to travel to new EU member states, 
especially to countries like Poland, which many recognize as an important player due to 
the special relationship it enjoys with Israel.  
 
Poland’s trilateral initiative and people-to-people approach aimed at bringing Palestinians 
and Israelis together based on Polish post-war reconciliation experience with the Ukraine 
and Germany is well-perceived among secular academics, Fatah and PLO officials. It is 
however doubtful that the same goes for Hamas sympathizers. A recent article in “The 
Economist” about joint Israeli-Palestinian projects argues that even though these types of 
initiatives are still popular among philanthropists, donors are slowly shifting their 
approach towards projects generating internal change in perceptions rather than cross-
cultural dialogue. Many Palestinians tirelessly repeat that reconciliation is the last stage 
of a war to peace transition and cannot come before the end of occupation and a peace 
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agreement. They see the solution more in terms of justice first, then reconciliation. While 
Polish officials assert that development aid should be Poland’s main tool for 
implementing its Middle Eastern policy, increasingly more Palestinian and European 
NGO workers argue that the region does not need more money or projects, rather the 
creation of a political environment, which would naturally favor human development and 
peace.  
 
In addition, it seems that the Palestinian strategy towards new EU member states is solely 
based on the premise that the more voices the better. As the weaker party, the PA cannot 
refuse help and when asked, it naturally welcomes any initiative stemming from new EU 
members – be it developmental or political. Palestinians hope to use this involvement 
towards achieving their strategic goal of statehood, by first presenting the facts on the 
ground to the countries at stake in the hope that the focus of EU policies will shift 
towards Israel. However, the PA’s interest in new EU member states does not necessarily 
seem to be part of a well-thought out strategy. They are perceived more in terms of 
numbers that can sway the EU balance on either side.  
 
In addition, there is doubt among Palestinians whether new EU member states fully 
understand regional dynamics and agendas as well as the interconnected nature of Middle 
Eastern conflicts. The rationale is that some countries with a bigger percentage of Muslim 
citizens might be more interested in regional dynamics, since they recognize that there 
exists a relationship between the Palestinian question and transnational Islamist 
movements – how it is understood or misunderstood is a different issue Although 
Palestinian officials themselves might not like to admit it, it is often suggested that in 
crucial times, both help and influence will be sought within key EU member states such 
as the UK, Germany, France and Spain and more importantly in Washington. In the 
words of an EU official, “the Arab world enjoys a kind of love – hate relationship” with 
the United States, admiring aspects of its lifestyle, but hating the fact that it does not play 
the role of an honest broker in the region, despite its potential to do so61. Because of their 
lack of real power as individual states, new EU members, if at all, are conceived in terms 
of pro-Palestinian PR. In terms of direct negotiations, the PLO and members of the Fatah-
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led government in the West Bank favor a greater involvement of the EU, but as a unified 
impartial body, translating its values grounded in international humanitarian law into 
policy as opposed to 27 separate and contradictory peace initiatives.  
 
5. The Israeli Narrative and Perception of Poland 
 
The 2004 EU enlargement was seen in Israel as a positive sign towards a more balanced 
EU Middle East policy. New Member States are perceived as pro-American and thus 
expected to support the Israeli position. Poland’s integration in particular was welcome in 
Israel with great enthusiasm. Through the cooperation with new member states, perceived 
as more pro-American and pro-Israeli, Israel could achieve more credibility within the 
EU, which traditionally did not trust its judgment on Middle Eastern policies62.   
 
While Poland has been trying to maintain a balanced position towards the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, accepting on the one hand the non-binding UN General Assembly 
Resolution pressuring the Jewish state to adopt the 2004 International Court of Justice 
advisory ruling and tear down the Wall in the West Bank, and strongly condemning 
Palestinian terrorism on the other, it is widely perceived among both EU and Israeli 
officials to be pro-Israeli. In recent years, Israeli diplomats in Warsaw have repeatedly 
called Poland their “best friend” and “ambassador in the European Union”63. Since the 
enlargement all Polish governments have led the same policy towards Israel, including 
the most recent coalition between the rightist “Law and Justice” with populist parties, 
deemed to be anti-Semitic. There seems to be a consensus on policy towards Israel, 
which has not been revisited even at critical times such as the 2006 Lebanon war or Gaza 
incursion.  
Given its history and often uneasy Polish-Jewish relations, Poland is very sympathetic to 
Israel’s situation. Also for Israel Poland is a very special country. As one interviewee in 
Israel said:  
“Poland is an integral part of World War II history. People do not have the 
same attitude towards Polish matters as they would towards French affairs 
for example. Poland is still a part of Jewish history, a part of the Holocaust. 
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The attitude towards Poland [in Israel] is very complicated. It is completely 
different than the one people would have towards the Czech Republic. It is 
completely different than towards any other country, except obviously 
Germany, but this does not count. People think of New Member States such 
as Czech, Romania or Hungary as of countries, where Jews used to live, and 
where until today there might still be a Jewish community. The attitude 
towards Poland is more emotional, more historic and more complex. 
Something else is expected out of Poland, not because Poland is guilty of 
anything, but because we shared a common history for a few centuries. This 
creates some sort of obligation”64 
 
 Poland shows its support to Israel through many symbolic gestures such as the often 
quoted museum of History of Polish Jews funded by the government and the municipality 
of Warsaw, special daily broadcasting in Hebrew on public radio or cultural events 
aiming to bring the two nations closer together. Indeed, the Polish government has 
allocated a special fund to the Adam Mickiewicz Cultural Institute to organize a series of 
different events in the next two years under the theme “Polish season in Israel”. 
According to an Israeli official: 
 
“Israel is special to Poland and there is more understanding for Israel in the 
country than anywhere else in the world, due to our shared histories. This 
grants Israel a particular position in Poland’s foreign policy to such an 
extent that policy towards Israel becomes part of Poland’s internal 
politics”65. 
 
Some voices in Israel go so far as to say that “there is a new Poland today”, one which is 
“striving to revive the chapter of [its] shared life with the Jews” and “erase the eras of 
Nazism and communism”, a Poland, aspiring to overshadow its ‘light anti-Semitism’ by 
“a wave of philo-Semitism66”. Quoting Israeli officials, Primor from Haaretz argues that 
“if there is a government in Europe that Israel relies on at times of trouble, it is the Polish 
one and that, despite the problematic elements in it”, referring to anti-Semitic statements 
of members of the Polish government such as the Minister of Education Roman Giertych 
or MEP Maciej Giertych, whose publication of an anti-Semitic pamphlet “Civilization at 
War in Europe” caused a much talked about scandal in Brussels. Overall, Israel perceives 
bilateral relations with Poland as strategic.  
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Such statements are indeed proven to be true not only in the realm of discourse and 
rhetoric, but also on the political level. After the dramatic and highly controversial 
Lebanon war in 2006, Poland’s president Lech Kaczyński was the first leader of a big, 
European country to come to Israel on an official visit. This was received in Israel as a 
symbolic gesture of Poland’s support at a time many criticized Tel Aviv for the use of 
excessive and disproportionate force against the Lebanese civilian population. While in 
the region, the President was careful to maintain balance and treat both conflicted parties 
equally, by remaining in the safety of broad declarations. This was evident during 
Kaczyński’s visit to Ramallah and meeting with President Abbas on the last day of his 
visit, when he stated that “Poland can have good relations with Israel and the PA” and 
that while Israel is a friend of Poland, it can still sympathize with Palestinians. Political 
support however does not necessary translate into a greater involvement on the ground, 
which neither party seems to be interested in. During his visit, Kaczyński was wary to 
deny any speculations of Poland brokering a prisoners’ swap between Hamas and the 
Israeli government stating that “there are other ways of leading this type of negotiations 
and Poland does not intend to fulfill a role, which can be done by a different party”67.  
 
Such statements are welcome in Israel, which appears to be more interested in declaratory 
diplomacy and official Polish positions than its involvement as an individual actor68. 
Israel did not respond positively to offers coming from Warsaw in 2002-2003 to organize 
a peace conference in Poland. The PA expressed enthusiasm, most probably due to 
reasons explained above: as the weaker party, it sees negotiations and peace as a matter 
of highest urgency and cannot afford to reject help. Israel, however, was more pragmatic 
and rejected the idea on the premise that it did not wield added value. It questioned Polish 
expertise in conflict resolution and its financial resources to be able to organize such an 
event. As such, the Israeli rationale echoes the Palestinian strategy. While, both the PA 
and Israel realize the potential of individual EU member states, or different blocs of 
countries to direct the course of European policies, they both seem to agree that the fewer 
players involved in direct negotiations, the better, as the potential to influence their 
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outcome is higher. According to Israeli officials, Poland’s role can be ‘useful’ solely as 
an EU member state influencing Council Conclusions and making sure that the pro-
Palestinian narrative, promoted mostly by Southern69 and Scandinavian countries – such 
as Sweden and Finland - does not prevail. In other words, Israel is interested in 
maintaining the status quo. Poland has been precisely responding to Israeli expectations 
and as such gained the recognition of “Israel’s ambassador in the EU”. Indeed, it has 
been successful in blocking Council Conclusions regarding the humanitarian situation in 
Gaza put forth by Portugal, since it perceived the language used as too pro-Palestinian70. 
In addition, Israeli officials believe that Poland can represent best their position regarding 
Iran’s nuclear program and have consequently concentrated their diplomatic efforts on 
targeting Warsaw.  
Another such example is the role that Polish MEP’s play in promoting a “balanced 
policy” towards the conflict. Indeed, some of them opposed a United Nations 
International Civil Society Conference on the on-going occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza held at the European Parliament at the end of August. Polish MEP’s belonging to 
different parties have taken a strong stance against the conference and in fact supported 
Israel’s efforts to boycott it based on the premise that by focusing on Israeli restrictive 
measures towards the civilian population, its program was completely anti-Israeli and 
thus counter-productive. Asked for the reasons why he would not take part in the 
conference, MEP Bronisław Geremek argued that the conference was biased and did not 
take into consideration the arguments of the other side, and as such was inviting it to 
organize a counter-conference equally one-sided. In his and other Polish MEP’s view, the 
European Parliament should be a platform for dialogue working towards reaching a 
Middle Eastern settlement, rather than a place of confrontation. Additionally, according 
to Geremek, MEP’s should try to change the Parliament’s image of being completely pro-
Palestinian. Hence, Poland and new EU member states are in favor of maintaining a 
balanced policy towards the conflict: “Polish MEP’s have demonstrated in the past that 
they also understand Israeli arguments. Poles as well as MEP’s from other new member 
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states are very active in making sure that EU policy towards the Middle East is 
evenhanded. Neither pro-Palestinian, nor pro-Israeli”71.  
 
Poland, as well as other new EU members can indeed afford to take such a stance, 
because it does not have a colonial past and as a result no moral debt towards the Arab 
world. As discussed above the lack of past involvement of new EU member states in the 
region is also perceived as an asset by the Palestinians, which see it as an opportunity for 
them to become honest brokers in the eyes of a formerly subjugated Muslim world. For 
the Israelis, however, it means an ability to “shake off the heritage of communism and the 
Eastern bloc's traditional pro-Arab policies72”. The question that one should ask at this 
point is whether in this case Israel wishes that Poland becomes a bigger player in the 
conflict? Does it want Poland to become anything more than “its [alleged] ambassador in 
the EU”? 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations: Potential for Bigger Involvement? 
All stakeholders in the Middle East perceive the gradually increasing the EU’s role in the 
region. Above all, many interviewees stressed that the EU presents a more neutral and 
objective stance. Israeli citizens have emphasized its anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian 
attitude in the past, but currently both sides highlight the EU’s intention to keep a policy 
of “equal distance”. The EU has also initiated programmes of more efficient monitoring 
of EU funds, especially after reports of corruption within the Palestinian government73 
and Israeli allegations of misuse of the funds for terrorist activities at the height of 
violence in 2002. The EU has also started to lead a more concrete policy towards the 
Middle East, which is not easy, since the EU does not have a coherent longstanding 
common foreign policy until today. In the words of one Israeli interviewee:  
 
“The European Union cannot be a strong player, because it does not know 
how to act on the basis of carrots and sticks. It only gives carrots, but cannot 
raise the stick and that’s why no one takes it seriously. Now, it has finally 
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achieved to raise the stick, even regarding such a minor issue, like the 
electricity plant, which they will stop funding [in Gaza]. The European 
Union is now taking very serious steps to halt assistance, which was not 
properly controlled before”.74 
 
While observing these changes in the EU stance, many Palestinian interviewees expect it 
to take other steps, in terms of political action. They would like it to take a more concrete 
position regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to see it exert influence on Israel.    
 
“In order for a peace settlement to be reached, both sides will have to accept 
very painful and large concessions. The influence of the EU can help both 
nations in making these concessions less painful and accepted with a little 
less disenchantment. Money can buy peace to a certain extent if the 
European Union said: if an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is reached, 
the EU will consider Israel’s membership in the EU. This would be very 
important for future talks about peace. Whether Israel wants to be part of the 
EU or not, is not even the question at this point, what is important is to 
know that the EU is considering this as an important issue.”75  
 
In order to become a “player not a payer” the EU needs to act as a unified body, taking 
short-term political decisions, which would not undermine its long-term political goals. 
As noted by Martti Ahtisaari and Joschka Fischer “Europeans are held back by the lack 
of an effective common strategy” towards the different conflicts in the region from 
Israel/Palestine to Iraq and Afghanistan. This was best exemplified by the 2006 Lebanon 
crisis, where “no fewer than 25 European ministers - each from a different country - 
traveled to Beirut, delivering mixed messages”76. EU officials in the field seem to agree 
that both Palestinians and Israelis are confused by a multitude of different initiatives, 
starting by those promoted by individual member states, the European commissioner for 
external relations and neighbourhood policy, the EU Special Envoy to the Middle East 
and finally the EU High Representative Javier Solana. As a divided body, the EU is 
naturally perceived as less efficient and harder to deal with than the United States for 
instance. Paradoxically, as the largest donor to the PA and as such arguably “a major 
subsidiary for the Israeli occupation” it becomes marginalized as a political player. In 
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order to reverse such a perception, the EU should work towards creating a political 
agenda and climate, which would enable negotiations and a genuine peace process. 
Arguably, the last thing that the Middle East needs is a separate peace initiative led by 
new EU member states simultaneously to the efforts undertaken by the Quartet and the 
Arab League. The joint statement of the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization presented at the Annapolis conference emphasized once again the 
importance that both parties place in the United States in the negotiations process, as they 
reconfirmed their commitment to the implementation of the Road Map under American 
monitoring and guidance77. 
 
In terms of diplomacy, Poland, as well as other new EU member states should 
concentrate their diplomatic efforts towards supporting a common EU strategy towards 
the region in order to create a real window of opportunity for final status negotiations. 
Only when speaking with one voice can the EU create incentives for peace, involve key 
regional actors in the process or lead to a reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, a pre-
condition for a comprehensive agreement.   
As one EC official noted, “help is always welcome” in brokering peace, but one needs to 
think about its added value. Does Poland or any other new EU member state have the 
capacity to bring about change and a fresh perspective to the conflict, which would force 
both parties to sit at the negotiating table? All stakeholders – whether it is Israel, the 
Palestinians, or new EU members - realize that the strength of an EU policy lies in its 
unified position. Due to competition among member states seeking exposure and 
pursuing their own agendas through development aid, there is a cacophony of initiatives 
leading to contradicting results. There is consensus among Polish officials that Poland 
should attempt to shape the conflict through its assistance program. It is however 
doubtful that by spending 0.5 million euros in 2006 – out of a total of 700 million euros 
spent by the EU – it will be able to achieve its long-term goals. Even bigger donors such 
as France, the UK or Spain with long established ODA programs have limited influence 
if they act alone. Israel is well aware of the fact that the United States has more leverage 
over all the different players than any EU member state. So are the Palestinians. Both 
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parties in the conflict seem to be solely interested in a greater role of a given country for 
Public Diplomacy purposes, in order to change other members’ positions and sway the 
overall balance in their favor. Similarly, while seeking to secure its own interests in the 
region, Poland seems to be more interested in reaching consensus within the EU rather 
than leading a policy of its own. Therefore, there seems to be agreement that there is no 
room for any new or old EU member to play a bigger bilateral role.  
 
Recommendations: 
 Rather than pursuing its own development initiatives in the Palestinian Territory, 
Poland should align its assistance with other existing and well-established EU 
programmes to achieve a greater overall impact and contribute to an effective 
institution-building process. It should work in close cooperation with other more 
experienced EU member states in development aid to achieve better coordination.  
 In order to contribute to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a 
negotiated peace settlement, Poland, and other new member states, should work 
towards a unified European position not only in Israel and the Palestinian Territory, 
but the whole region.  Separate initiatives of member states appear confusing to both 
the Palestinian Authority and Israel, while the European Union becomes in their eyes 
a less effective body than the United States.  
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